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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-1968 ANTI-RIOT Statute Up-
held in United States v. Dellinger.
Prior to and during the time of the 1968 Democratic Convention
David Dellinger, Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, Abbie Hoffman and
Jerry Rubin made various speeches in Chicago, Illinois, the site of the
convention.1 Dellinger, Davis and Hayden were associated with an or-
ganization called the National Mobilization Committee to End the War
in Vietnam (better known as "MOBE"). Hoffman and Rubin were
organizers of the Youth International Party (better known as the "Yip-
pies"). As a result of their speeches all five were prosecuted for travel-
ing in interstate commerce, from outside of Illinois to the City of Chi-
cago, with intent to incite, organize, promote and encourage a riot.2
The five were convicted in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois3 for violating the 1968 Anti-Riot Act.4 The
1. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973). The speech or speeches which were used in evidence to prove
the charges against the defendants are as follows: against Dellinger, August 28, 1968,
at Grant Park; against Davis, August 1, 1968, at 30 West Chicago Ave., August 9,
1968, at the "MOBE" office (407 S. Dearborn Street), August 18, 1968, at 1012
North Noble Street and August 26, 1968, at Grant Park; against Hayden, August 26.
1968, at Lincoln Park and August 28, 1968, at Grant Park; against Hoffman, Au-
gust 26, 1968, at Lincoln Park, August 27, 1968, at Lincoln Park and August 29,
1968 at Grant Park; and against Rubin, August 25, 1968, at Lincoln Park, August 26,
1968, at Lincoln Park and August 27, 1968, at Lincoln Park.
2. Id.
3. United States v. Dellinger, 69 CR 180 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 1970).
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2102 (1968). 18 U.S.C. § 2101 provides:
(a)(1) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facil-
ity of interstate or foreign commerce, including, but not limited to, the mail,
telegraph, telephone, radio, or television, with intent-
(A) to incite a riot; or
(B) to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot;
or
(C) to commit any act of violence in furtherance of a riot; or(D) to aid or abet any person in inciting or participating in or carrying
on a riot or committing any act of violence in furtherance of a riot;
and who either during the course of any such travel or use or thereafter per-
forms or attempts to perform any other overt act for any purpose specified in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of this paragraph-
Shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
(b) In any prosecution under this section, proof that a defendant engaged
or attempted to engage in one or more of the overt acts described in sub-
paragraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and
(1) has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, or (2) has use of or
used any facility of interstate or foreign commerce, including but not limited
to, mail, telegraph, telephone, radio, or television, to communicate with or
broadcast to any person or group of persons prior to such overt acts, such
travel or use shall be admissible proof to establish that such defendant trav-
eled in or used such facility of interstate for foreign commerce.
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defendants appealed their conviction and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case. Vari-
ous errors committed at trial warranted reversal. First, there was a
unanimous finding by the court that the demeanor of the trial judge
and prosecutors was improper. Secondly, the court held that it was
error not to allow voir dire questions on the attitude of the prospective
jurors upon such topics as the Vietnam War, counter-cultural life and
police misconduct. Finally, the court concluded that it was reversible
error for the trial judge and marshal to communicate with the deliberat-
ing jury.5 However, these grounds for reversal will not be examined
in the course of this comment. Rather, the scope of the comment will
be confined to a discussion of the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act.
(c) A judgment of conviction or acquittal on the merits under the laws of
any State shall be a bar to any prosecution hereunder for the same act or
acts.
(d) Whenever, in the opinion of the Attorney General or of the ap-
propriate officer of the Department of Justice charged by law or under the
instructions of the Attorney General with authority to act, any person shall
have violated this chapter, the Department shall proceed as speedily as pos-
sible with a prosecution of such person hereunder and with any appeal which
may lie from any decision adverse to the Government resulting from such
prosecution; or in the alternative shall report in writing, to the respective
Houses of the Congress, the Department's reason for not so proceeding.(e) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to make it un-
lawful for any person to travel in, or use any facility of, interstate or foreign
commerce for the purpose of pursuing the legitimate objectives of organized
labor, through orderly and lawful means.
(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed as indicating an intent on
the part of Congress to prevent any State, any possession or Commonwealth
of the United States, or the District of Columbia, from exercising jurisdic-
tion over any offense over which it would have jurisdiction in the absence of
this section; nor shall anything in this section be construed as depriving
State and local law enforcement authorities of responsibility for prosecuting
acts that may be violations of this section and that are violations of State
and local law.
18 U.S.C. § 2102 provides:
(a) As used in this chapter, the term "riot" means a public disturbance
involving (1) an act or acts of violence by one or more persons part of an
assemblage of three or more persons, which act or acts shall constitute a
clear and present danger of, or shall result in, damage or injury to the prop-
erty of any other person or to the person of any other individual or (2) a
threat or threats of the commission of an act or acts of violence by one or
more persons part of an assemblage of three or more persons having, individu-
ally or collectively, the ability of immediate execution of such threat or
threats, where the performance of the threatened act or acts of violence
would constitute a clear and present danger of, or would result in, damage
or injury to the property of any other person or to the person of any other
individual.
(b) As used in this chapter, the term "to incite a riot", or "to organize,
promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot," includes, but is not
limited to, urging or instigating other persons to riot, but shall not be
deemed to mean the mere oral or written (1) advocacy of ideas or (2) ex-
pression of belief, not involving advocacy of any act or acts of violence or
assertion of the rightness of, or the right to commit, any such act or acts.
5. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct.
1443 (1973).
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I. DOCTRINES OF OVERBREADTH, VAGUENESS
AND CHILLING EFFECT
A legislative act may suggest two possible constructions-one con-
struction constitutionally valid, the other constitutionally invalid. In
cases where the constitutionality of a particular statute is at issue, the
courts have relied upon the "well established rule of strict construc-
tion."'  The rule enables the interpreting court to choose the construc-
tion that will uphold the constitutionality of the statute.7  The rule of
strict construction, however, does not apply to statutes which involve
first amendment issues. The reason is that since first amendment
rights have a preferred position over other constitutional rights, statutes
which involve first amendment issues must be examined extra care-
fully.' The extra careful examination does not imply that statutes which
concern the first amendment have a presumption of unconstitutionality.
It is only a warning to the legislatures that first amendment statutes
will be scrutinized for overbreadth and vagueness. 9
The concept of overbreadth is used to describe a statute which is so
broadly drafted that it "may describe and give warning regarding
conduct which cannot constitutionally be penalized."'10 The traditional
approach used by the courts in determining the constitutionality of an
allegedly overbroad statute is the application of the statute to the facts
of the instant case.1' The Supreme Court, in United States v. Raines,"
expressed this approach by saying that federal courts should never "for-
mulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is to be applied.' 3
Because the first amendment rights have a preferred position, the
normal doctrine of overbreadth is not followed when the courts inter-
pret statutes affecting first amendment rights. While the Raines4 rule
6. McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182, 1214 (1959).
7. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 390 (1924); Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
8. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56-57 (1953) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963). See also McKay, The
Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182, 1213 (1959); Cahn, The Firstness
of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464 (1956).
9. McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182, 1213 (1959).
10. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 355 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
11. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844
(1970).
12. 362U.S. 17 (1960).
13. Id. at 21.
14. Id. The Court in Raines states, "... that one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that im-
pliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which
its application might be unconstitutional."
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is that the constitutionality of a statute is determined only by its effect
on the person challenging the statute, the first amendment overbreadth
doctrine mandates application of the challenged statute to all "hypo-
thetical persons whose privileged activities come within the sweep of
an overbroad law."'15 Therefore, when first amendment rights conflict
with an existing statute, the judiciary will declare the statute void on
its face. As stated in Thornhill v. Alabama:
Where regulations of the liberty of free discussion are concerned,
there are special reasons for observing the rule that it is the statute,
and not the accusation or the evidence under it, which prescribes
the limits of permissible conduct and warns against transgression.' 6
The doctrine of chilling effect is related to the concept of first amend-
ment overbreadth. There are two major reasons for courts to apply
the chilling effect doctrine, the first of which is to prevent deterrence on
first amendment rights.' 7 Since the first amendment freedoms are
favored, the theory is that no statute should be allowed to exist which
has the slighest possibility of transgressing upon those freedoms. As
the Court in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button said:
These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual applications of sanctions.
. . . Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space
to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow
specificity.' 8
Secondly, the chilling effect doctrine is applied by courts so that no
one is forced to test his first amendment rights on a case by case
basis. Rather than having each person vindicate his own case, "the
whole statute must be declared a violation of the first amendment and
void for all applications."' 9  In the landmark decision of Dombrowski
v. Pfister, the United States Supreme Court concluded that:
If the rule were otherwise, the contours of regulation would have
to be hammered out case by case-and tested by only those hardy
enough to risk criminal prosecution to determine the proper scope
of regulation. 20
15. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 847
(1970).
16. 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1940).
17. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844,
853 (1970); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
808 (1969).
18. 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (citations omitted).
19. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 356 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93
S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
20. 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
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Therefore, not only does the first amendment warn legislators that
proposed legislation may have the effect of deterring protected activity,
but also that legislation which concerns the first amendment may be
declared unconstitutional on its face. The first amendment was de-
signed to protect and to encourage its favored rights.
2
'
The concept of overbreadth is based upon principles of substantive
due process and the main issue is whether the language of the statute
given its normal meaning is so broad that its sanctions may apply to
constitutionally protected conduct. -2  On the other hand, the concept
of vagueness is based upon the principle of procedural due process
which requires proper judicial standards and fair notice. 23  To deter-
mine whether a statute is vague, courts will examine its provisions to
see if they give citizens reasonable notice of prohibited conduct. Fur-
thermore, a statute must set forth adequate standards to guide the judge
or jury in its determination of guilt. The thrust of the vagueness doctrine
is to prevent men of common intelligence from being required to guess
at the meaning of a statute.2 4
In statutes affecting first amendment rights there is almost total mer-
ger between the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness. The reason
may be that with statutes affecting first amendment freedoms, men of
common intelligence are often equally confused as to the permissible
scope of the statute and to its literal meaning.2 5 In fact, the Supreme
Court has often used the idioms of first amendment overbreadth and
vagueness interchangeably. 6 In any event, when a statute concerns
itself with first amendment rights, the courts will carefully examine the
statute to see that it has not violated the concepts of overbreadth and
vagueness and to determine that a chilling effect will not result from its
application. The constitutional requirement is that first amendment
statutes be drawn sufficiently narrow in scope. -7
21. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 952 (N.D. I11. 1968), rev'd sub nom.
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971). Though Landry was reversed, the case provided
an excellent discussion of the concepts of vagueness and overbreadth.
22. Id. at 951; see Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40
CORNELL L.Q. 195, 197 (1955).
23. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 951 (N.D. Ill. 1968), rev'd sub nom.
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
24. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); See also Note,
The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. OF PA. L. REV. 67
(1960).
25. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844,
874 (1970).
26. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965); Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242, 259 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). However
a case that drew a distinction was Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1967).
27. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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II. REGULATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
The United States Constitution says, "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech ... ."Is Though this negative
restriction on Congressional power is constructed in the absolute, the
Supreme Court has not interpreted the right to speech as an absolute
freedom.29 In the famous words of Mr. Justice Holmes speaking for
the majority in Schenck v. United States: "The most stringent protec-
tion of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theater and causing a panic. '30
As a result, the Supreme Court has evolved a standard which bal-
ances rational government interests against the individual's right to
freedom of speech, thereby restraining certain speech.3 ' Libel 2 and
obscenity,33 for instance, are the two most common forms of speech
which have been prohibited by the government. The justifications for
proscribing these actions are generally apolitical. However, legislative
regulation of speech may not be apolitical in those areas which pose a
threat to the established system. In determining whether there is cause
for regulation of speech, the government will first determine the sub-
stance of the threat. For example, advocating the Communist ideology
has been viewed as a threat to American democracy. In the case of
Yates v. United States, 4 wherein fourteen people were convicted of ad-
vocating Communism in violation of the Smith Act, 5 the Court dif-
ferentiated between urging someone to do something and urging some-
one to believe in something. The Court drew a distinction between
the "advocacy of abstract doctrine from the advocacy of action. '36
While advocacy of beliefs or ideas may not be infringed upon by leg-
islation, advocacy that inspires destructive action may be infringed
upon. Although advocacy of action may be regulated, the regulation
will further depend on the immediacy of the action. 7 In the decision
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
29. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951); Chaplinsky v. State of
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942); For a contrary view see Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56-71 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
30. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
31. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 318-27 (1957).
32. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
33. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
34. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1940).
36. 354 U.S. 298, 325 (1957).
37. The earliest test was pronounced by Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority, wrote,
"The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
584
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of Brandenburg v. Ohio8 the Court enunciated the requirements that
would enable a court to strike down a statute which on its face denied
the first amendment right to free speech.39 Expanding on the Yates 4°
distinction between advocacy of belief and advocacy of action, the
Court said that before advocacy of action may be regulated or punished
it must be shown that: ". . . such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such
action."'" Therefore, the only speech that may be regulated by legisla-
tion is speech that is intended to and has capacity to cause imminent
lawless action.
A pertinent example of speech likely to produce imminent lawless
action is that which is directed towards inciting a riot. When speech
becomes so provocative that it actually proximates action, the constitu-
tional protection is abandoned.
When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference
with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to
public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the state to
prevent or punish is obvious. 42
III. THE MAJORITY DECISION
Prior to United States v. Dellinger,43 the Anti-Riot Act was chal-
lenged in the case of National Mobilization Committee to End the War
in Vietnam v. Foran.. 4 The plaintiffs in Foran, who included three
of the defendants in Dellinger, tried to enjoin the United States Attor-
ney from presenting evidence to a grand jury. The plaintiffs contended
that the Anti-Riot Act was both unconstitutional on its face and as ap-
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree." See also Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger":
From Schenck to Brandenburg-And Beyond, 1969 S. CT. REV. 41.
38. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
39. Defendants on page 21 of their brief argued that prior to Brandenburg, the
case of Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), retained sufficient potency to en-
able an advocacy statute to survive an attack on its face and be constitutionally
tested by subsequent standards of construction and application. Brief for defendants at
21, U.S. v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
However, since Brandenburg, it is clear that the first amendment statutes must be tested
on their face. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
40. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
41. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
42. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951), quoting Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
43. 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
44. 411 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1969). It must be noted that Foran was decided
after Brandenburg.
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plied.45 In a brief opinion, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's46 ruling which denied plaintiffs' relief. The Seventh Circuit
said that the Act was not void on its face, and ". . . that the Riot pro-
visions are not such an encroachment on free speech nor so vague and
indefinite as to present a substantial constitutional question. '47
In Dellinger, the Seventh Circuit decided to re-examine the constitu-
tionality of the Anti-Riot Act because that case presented issues that
were not brought to its attention in Foran.48  The Dellinger court said
the question of the validity of the Anti-Riot Act on its face is whether:
".. . it punishes speech only when a sufficiently close relationship be-
tween such speech and violent action is found to exist." 49
A United States citizen has a right to freely travel throughout the
country without undue restriction. 50 Since the Anti-Riot Act denies in-
terstate travel or facilities to those who have the specific intent to commit
one of the prohibited acts, the defendants challenged the Act as being
an unconstitutional burden on the right to travel.5 ' The majority re-
fused the defendants' argument, stating that the element of interstate
45. In National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam v. Foran,
297 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. I11. 1968), the plaintiffs wanted to convene a three-judge fed-
eral court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284 (1964) for the purpose of passing on the
constitutionality of an act of Congress.
46. 297 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
47. 411 F.2d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 1969). The Seventh Circuit further stated,
"That is all we are to determine under Section 2182 of the Judicial Code [28 U.S.C.]
and therefore we need not and do not consider whether the Riot statute might possibly
be misapplied." The Seventh Circuit, although recognizing a remnant of Whitney,
did not rely on any remnant of Whitney. See note 39 supra.
48. Two other courts have agreed with the conclusions of Foran: Livingston v.
Garmire, 437 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.), opinion withdrawn on rehearing, 442 F.2d 1322(5th Cir. 1971); and Douglas v. Pitcher, 319 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. La. 1970). It
must be noted that in Livingston and Douglas the issue was not the constitutionality
of the Anti-Riot Act. See, however, In re Shead, 302 F. Supp. 560, 567 (N.D. Cal.
1969) aII'd on other grounds in Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1969).
In In re Shead, the district court did pass on the Anti-Riot Act by stating:
This Court only holds that the Congressional Act effectively avoids the infirm-
ities of overbreadth and vagueness. Adequate guidance delineating between
lawful and unlawful conduct is given to the public in compliance with the
standards of due process of law.
49. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 360 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93
S. Ct. 1443 (1973). For an analysis of Congressional power, based on the commerce
clause, to create the Anti-Riot Act see Note, The Riot Act of 1968: Congress Rides a
Trojan Horse, 4 GA. L. REV. 359, 361-72 (1970).
50. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966).
51. P. 107 of defendants' brief states:
The burden that such a statute places on 'freedom of movement' for the
purpose of exercising First Amendment rights is staggering. Any 'outside
agitator' (who by virtue of being such will have crossed state lines and
have committed a wholly lawful 'overt act') runs the risk that he will be
accused of having done so with 'evil intent.' The college student who helps
black sharecroppers in Mississippi to organize may be found to have the
'intent' to 'aid and abet one of them in carrying on a riot'.
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travel mentioned in §2101 (a) (1) was merely the federal jurisdic-
tional factor. As the Seventh Circuit said:
We view the statutory element of interstate travel (or use of fa-
cilities), accompanied by the specified intent, as an element which
Congress required as the foundation for its power to punish the
conduct of inciting or participating in a riot.52
As a result, the major problem confronting the court was the impact
of the Anti-Riot Act on free speech.5 3  The central prohibition of the
Anti-Riot Act is, of course, "riot". There is, however, no requirement
in the Anti-Riot Act that the "riot" actually occur and the Seventh
Circuit faced the assertion that failure to provide that a riot occur
makes the statute unconstitutional. The defendants argued that frus-
trated attempts to cause riots have an insufficient nexus with action
which may constitutionally be regulated. 4 The Seventh Circuit did not
accept the argument because Brandenburg prohibited advocacy that was
"likely to produce or incite imminent lawless action."55  The Seventh
Circuit held that the Act was consistent with Brandenburg in that the
statute simply punished lawless action that was likely to be accom-
plished. Thus, if a person traveled interstate with the intent to incite
or carry on a riot5" and that activity was interrupted by an intervening
force, such as police action, that person could still be prosecuted for
violating the Anti-Riot Act. The consummated riot need not occur
for a person to be prosecuted for violating the inchoate parts of the
Anti-Riot Act.57
Defendants had argued that since the enumerated acts of §2101(a)
(1)(A)-(D) were merely steps toward a goal to riot and not steps
in the fulfillment of riot, the Anti-Riot Act was unconstitutional. If the
enumerated acts listed in §2101(a) (1) (A)-(D) were to be construed
as steps taken to perfect the goal to riot, there would be an inadequate
relationship between those enumerated acts and constitutionally pro-
52. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 359 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93
S. Ct. 1443 (1973). At times the government argued that the "gravamen of the
offense" was really travel with intent. The Seventh Circuit was unwilling to accept
this argument on the grounds that the government's proposed construction of the
statute would clearly be a violation of the right to travel.
53. Though the Seventh Circuit recognized the constitutional protection of free-
dom of assembly, the court felt that there appeared to be "no question of validity
with respect to freedom of assembly which requires distinct consideration." 472 F.2d
340, 358 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973). See note 17 supra.
54. 472 F.2d 340, 362 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
55. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
56. See note 4 supra for full text of the statute.
57. 472 F.2d 340, 362 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973). How-
ever, for one to be prosecuted under § 2101(a)(1)(C) the riot must be in progress;
"(C) to commit any act of violence in furtherance of a riot;"
1973
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hibited action. 8 The defendants' interpretation of the acts prohibited
by §2101(a)(1) (A)-(D) as merely steps toward a goal to riot is de-
rived from the following language of §2101 (a) (1):
...who either during the course of any such travel or use or
thereafter performs or attempts to perform any other overt act for
any purpose specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D)
. . .59 (emphasis added)
The Seventh Circuit rejected the defendants' interpretation. The
court relied upon §2101(b) to substantiate its position that the pro-
hibited acts of §2101(a)(1) (A)-(D) were steps in the fulfillment of
a riot. The following wording was germane:
In any prosecution under this section, proof that a defendant en-
gaged or attempted to engage in one or more of the overt acts de-
scribed in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D). . .o (emphasis
added)
The majority believed that in using the term overt acts, Congress clearly
mandated that §2101 (a)(1 ) (A)-(D) set forth steps in the fulfillment
of a riot.
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit upheld the Anti-Riot Act in accord-
ance with the requirements of Brandenburg.1  The constitutionally
prohibited action is the actual occurrence or likelihood of a riot. The
overt acts which will either produce or have the possibility of produc-
ing a riot are enumerated in §2101(a)(1) (A)-(D). If a person
travels interstate or uses interstate facilities with the intent to make a
speech that would incite, organize, promote or encourage a riot, that
person may be prosecuted under the Anti-Riot Act. These acts, how-
ever, "must be specifically intended at the time of travel, and one of
them must be the purpose for which the required overt act is done or
attempted."' '62
Although the Anti-Riot Act met the Brandenburg requirement that
the prohibited action occur or have a likelihood of occurrence, a fur-
ther requirement had to be met. The Yates63 decision held that ad-
vocacy of action could be prohibited but advocacy of expression could
not be prohibited. The defendants in Dellinger argued that §2102
(b)64 punished advocacy of expression; that the use of the word
58. 472 F.2d 340, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
59. See note 4 supra (emphasis added) for full text of the statute.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
62. 472 F.2d 340, 361 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
63. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
64. See note 4 supra for full text of the statute.
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"urging" in §2102(b) meant "little more than an effort at persua-
sion." 5 Since persuasion to riot would not be a forceful threat of ac-
tion but rather harmless coaxing, the use of the word "urging" was
fatal to the constitutionality of the statute.
The Seventh Circuit rejected the defendants' interpretation of the
meaning of "urging." The word "urge" indicates a pressing manner of
overcoming a drawback to a certain course; 66 therefore, "urging" was
not merely harmless persuasion but a pressing for action which could
be constitutionally prohibited. The court pointed out that in Street v.
New York,67 the Supreme Court had interchangeably used the words
"urge" and "incite."6
The defendants' strongest argument that §2102(b) prevented con-
stitutionally protected expression was the highly technical problem of
the "double negative":
(b) As used in this chapter, the term "to incite a riot" or to or-
ganize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a "riot", in-
cludes, but is not limited to, urging or instigating other persons to
riot, but shall not be deemed to mean the mere oral or written (1)
advocacy of ideas or (2) expression of belief, not involving ad-
vocacy of any act or acts of violence or assertion of the rightness of
or the right to commit, any such act or acts.69 (emphasis added)
Since a negation of a negation results in an affirmation and an exclusion
from an exclusion results in an inclusion, defendants argued that the
Anti-Riot Act prevented and punished oral or written advocacy which
merely asserted a belief in the rightness of violent acts.7 0 Beliefs and
ideas are expressions that are constitutionally protected by the first
amendment. Because the language of. §2101(b) was overly broad
and therefore could produce a chilling effect on one's first amendment
right of free expression, the defendants argued that the Anti-Riot Act
was unconstitutionally void on its face.71
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Anti-Riot Act was not un-
constitutional.72  The court first reasoned that the "double negative" in
§2101(b) was the result of an abundance of caution by the drafters to
insure that mere expressions of beliefs and ideas would be protected.
65. 472 F.2d 340, 361 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
66. Id. at 362.
67. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
68. Id. at 591. "We begin with the interest in preventing incitement. Appellant's
words, taken alone, did not urge anyone to do anything unlawful."
69. See note 4 supra (emphasis added) for full text of the statute.
70. § 2102(b) was not presented to or considered by the court in Foran.
71. Defendants' brief at 20-26.
72. 472 F.2d 340, 355 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
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While admitting the awkward phraseology of the "double negative", the
court explained that the purpose of the "double negative" was to ex-
clude the "described advocacy not from the preceding exclusion but
from the terms being defined."7  Therefore, the exclusionary phrase
of §2102(b)(2) was an added protection by the drafters that expres-
sions of belief would not be prevented or punished.74
The Seventh Circuit ruled that the added exclusion of §2102(b)(2) re-
flected the drafters' realization that a highly inciting speech to cause a
riot will often contain an assertion by the speaker on the rightness of
such rioting. Hence, the added exclusion of §2102(b) (2) was meant
to deter the inciting speaker from defending his speech on the theory
that he was only expressing a mere belief.7 1
Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendants' argument that
§2102(b) placed a chilling effect on the first amendment right to free
speech. In support of their position, the defendants relied upon the
rule of Dombrowski v. Pfister:7 1
So long as the statute remains available to the State the threat
of prosecutions of protected expression is a real and substantial
one. Even the prospect of ultimate failure of such prosecutions
by no means dispels their chilling effect on protected expression. 77
Because the issue of the "double negative" had eluded everybody in
Foran, the Seventh Circuit surmised that there was only a minimal pos-
sibility of prosecutions being based on the defendants' construction of
§2102(b).78  Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that because
the Anti-Riot Act did not suffer from overbreadth or vagueness the
Anti-Riot Act was constitutional.
IV. THE DISSENT
Judge Pell, in his dissent, alleged that the Anti-Riot Act was clearly
a violation of the first amendment right of free speech."9 He acknowl-
edged that a sufficiently narrow statute could have been drawn, but
felt that the Anti-Riot Act was facially unconstitutional.8 0  However,
the dissent thought that the issue of whether the statute was unconstitu-
tional on its face did not require the Seventh Circuit to "propose con-
73. Id. at 363.
74. See note 4 supra for full text of the statute.
75. 472 F.2d 340, 363 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
76. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
77. Id. at 494 (citations omitted). 472 F.2d 340, 364 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
78. 472 F.2d 340, 364 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
79. Id. at 409.
80. Id. at 410.
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stitutionally acceptable guidelines for a national anti-riot statute."''
The exclusive duty of the Seventh Circuit in Dellinger was to deter-
mine the constitutionality of the statute as it was written.
The dissent was concerned about the lack of a relationship between
the time that one traveled interstate and the time that one committed
any of the prohibited acts of §2101(a) (1) (A)-(D). Particularly
disturbing to the dissent was the phrase of §2101(a)(1) which states:
. . . and who either during the course of any such travel or use
thereafter performs or attempts to perform any other overt act...s2
(emphasis added)
A basic principle of criminal common law is that the mental element
of intent occur simultaneously with the criminal act.83  The dissent felt
that the mental element of intent should not have been so loosely con-
nected to the jurisdictional factor of interstate travel. Under the Anti-
Riot Act, someone could have crossed the state line with the past intent
of inciting a riot and could still be subject to federal prosecution for
what is in essence a local crime.8 4 To Judge Pell, this effect of the
Anti-Riot Act worked a "discouraging impact on the freedom to tra-
vel."8 5
More importantly, the dissent thought that the Anti-Riot Act is un-
constitutionally overbroad. Besides having a strong distaste for the
generally awkward draftsmanship of the statute,80 the dissent was par-
ticularly critical of two areas. The first area was the use of the word
"urging" in §2102(b). Since the word urge is so ambiguous, the
dissent felt that the drafters should provide a precise meaning of "urg-
ing" as used in §2102(b). Under the existing Anti-Riot Act, ad-
verse parties can demonstrate acceptable, but contrary, definitions of
"urging." In a statute involving first amendment rights, a multiple defi-
nition of a crucial word is fatal to that statute's constitutionality.
Where the determination of constitutionality is decided upon whether
a word defines action or expression, that word itself must have a speci-
fic definition. In doubtful cases, the dissent would deem the word a
term of expression and not action. Otherwise, the courts would be
guilty of judicially rewriting legislation in the area of first amendment
81. Id. at 415.
82. See note 4 supra (emphasis added) for full text of the statute.
83. Note, The Riot Act of 1968: Congress Rides a Trojan Horse, 4 GA. L. REV.
359, 381 (1970). See also United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670, 671 (1878): "The
Criminal intent essential to the commission of an offense must exist when the act
complained of is done. .... "
84. 472 F.2d 340, 414 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
85. Id. at 415.
86. 472 F.2d 340, 411-12 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
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rights.8 7 Judge Pell would interpret "urging" as a word of expression,
thereby striking down the Anti-Riot Act as overly broad.
The dissent also said that the statute was vague. If a person ex-
pressed a sincere belief in the rightness of violence to achieve social
goals and also exclaimed that such violence was necessary to achieve
those goals, he could be prosecuted under the existing Anti-Riot Act.
The dissent believed that the definition of "urging" in §2102(b)
places an awful burden on an individual's decision to express sincere
beliefs. The citizen has no guide in determining how sincere he can
be in the expression of his personal beliefs.
The matter of the "double negative" in §2102(b) was the second
critical question concerning unconstitutional overbreadth. The dissent
conceded that the matter would be different if §2102(b)(2) stopped
after the phrase "expression of belief."'88  Similarly, there would have
been no problem had § 2102(b) been worded:
but shall not be deemed to mean the mere oral or written (1)
advocacy of ideas or (2) expressions of belief, even though involv-
ing advocacy of any act or acts of violence or assertion of the right-
ness of, or the right to commit any such act or acts.89
Since those constructions were not used, the dissent felt that the
Anti-Riot Act is void on its face, the invalidity being that the statute
prohibits free expression. As stated by the Supreme Court in Noto v.
United States:
We held in Yates and we reiterate now, that the mere abstract
teaching of ... theory, including the teaching of the moral pro-
priety or even the moral necessity for a resort to force and vio-
lence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and
steeling it to such action.90
The Anti-Riot Act gives no protection to the interstate traveler who
expresses a belief in the right of violence as a means of relieving social
ills. Under the statute, the one who merely expresses an opinion on
the propriety of violence is just as apt to be prosecuted as the one who
truly incites lawless action. Under the controlling weight of Branden-
burg, the dissent stated that the Anti-Riot Act failed to draw the line
between protected and unprotected speech. Therefore, the dissent
would hold the Anti-Riot Act unconstitutionally void on its face.
87. Id. at 414.
88. See note 4 supra for full text of the statute.
89. 472 F.2d 340, 412 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
90. 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961).
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V. CONCLUSION
The most dangerous aspect of the Anti-Riot Act is its overbreadth.
The Anti-Riot Act fails to spell out the appropriate guidelines of con-
stitutionally protected conduct. Constitutionally protected conduct
depends on the subjective views of the federal officials who enforce the
statute. An overly broad statute cannot exist on the assumption that
federal prosecutors will only prosecute the extreme violations of that
statute. In the precious area of first amendment rights, the legislatures
must articulate specific guidelines to prevent arbitrary decision making.
The Anti-Riot Act does not preclude the possibility that its provisions
will be enforced in an arbitrary manner. The chilling effect of the
Anti-Riot Act should not remain unnoticed by the judiciary.
Furthermore, the Anti-Riot Act is unconstitutionally vague and Del-
linger exemplifies this conclusion. In Dellinger judges of the Seventh
Circuit offered divergent meanings of the word "urging" as used in
§2102(b). If judges of the Seventh Circuit had different opinions in
interpreting the meaning of "urging", surely the common man will be
confused. Therefore, the Anti-Riot Act has not told the American
citizen how sincere and how aggressive he can be in expressing his
beliefs.
Because the first amendment right of free speech is so essential, it
should not remain stifled by the Anti-Riot Act. As Judge Pell said in
his dissent:
• . . [T]hough we or at least the substantial majority of us, may
find it abhorrent to think that the rightness of violence should ever
be advocated, even though expressed as an idea or belief, neverthe-
less, the distaste must be overridden in preservation of the essen-
tial freedom here at stake.91
The Anti-Riot Act, being both overly broad and vague, results in a
chilling effect that cannot be described as minimal.12 Prosecution for
protected free expression is a real threat under the controversial pro-
visions of the Anti-Riot Act.
JOHN M. STALMACK
91. 472 F.2d 340, 413 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1443 (1973).
92. Id. at 364.
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